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Many political issues like abortion, gay marriage or assisted suicide are strongly contested 
because individuals have preferences not only over their own choice but also about other 
individuals’ actions. How should society decide these issues? This paper compares three 
regimes (centralization, decentralization and federalism) in an economy where individuals 
choose their residence and vote over a single-dimensional regulatory policy at the regional 
and national level. The main results are: (i) A move from decentralization to federalism, 
called moral federalism, is welfare improving behind the veil of ignorance if and only if 
centralization dominates decentralization, and (ii) for the group that favors a restrictive policy 
moral federalism is the more attractive the smaller its group size (subject to being the majority 
group), the larger the suffering from a given policy, and the smaller the regions’ weight in 
determining the federal policy limit. The results are consistent with the Bush administration’s 
attempt to restrict liberal policy choices at the state level after its narrow election victory in 
2000. 
Keywords: federalism, decentralization, Tiebout equilibrium, consumption externality, 
morals. 
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 1 Introduction
Many political issues are strongly contested because they a¤ect and deal with individual
values. For example, the question whether gay marriage should be legal or not pitches
individuals who believe in the sanctity of traditional marriage against those who believe in
the freedom of individual decision and the equality of heterosexual and homosexual marriage.
What makes this debate so controversial is that individuals not only have a strong preference
over their own choice, but also over other individuals’ actions. Opponents of same-sex
marriage su¤er when gays are allowed to marry, and vice versa, homosexuals often feel a
sense of loss when they and other gays are prohibited to marry. Yet, on re‡ection, there are
many political issues that involve moral questions similar to same-sex marriage: Assisted
suicide, gun control, abortion, stem cell research, medical marijuana, and the death penalty,
to name just a few. The clash over these issues is particularly strong when countries or regions
with di¤erent religious or political cultures collide, something that is not only evident in the
US.1 In the EU, for example, countries di¤er in terms of their attitudes and laws toward
gay marriage and assisted suicide, where typically northern European countries have more
liberal laws than those in southern Europe.
How should society decide these controversial issues? To some the question might be
provocative, precisely because fundamental individual values are at stake. It is probably
true that moral issues such as abortion can never be solved to both sides’ satisfaction. This
does not mean, however, that economists cannot shed light on the question. One possible
answer, in the spirit of the seminal paper by Charles Tiebout (1956), is to let people choose
their residence based on di¤erent policies o¤ered in various jurisdictions.2 In the context of
gay marriage supporters would join to live in one jurisdiction in which homosexual marriage is
legalized, while opponents live together in a region where a restrictive policy is implemented.
Such an arrangement would not satisfy those who believe in traditional marriage, but this
per se does not make the Tiebout equilibrium a bad one because at least one group is always
1A recent poll in the U.S. found that 49% in the West but only 32% in the South believe that homosexual
relations should be legal. See Denver Post, ”Ban on same-sex marriage supported,” December 21, 2003, p.
A1 and A25.
2Tiebout, as most of the subsequent literature, is concerned with …scal decisions, whereas here a particular
class of regulatory issues is examined.
1unhappy.3
Starting from the Tiebout equilibrium proponents of a restrictive policy may gain by
using the federal government in an attempt to constrain individual jurisdictions in their
choice. Thereby they could impose indirectly their individual morals on others. This scenario
has played out in the United States under the Bush administration several times. For
example, Attorney General John Ashcroft has tried to prosecute users of medical marijuana
in California even though a state initiative allowed the practice. Similarly, he has made
attempts to overrule an Oregon law permitting assisted suicide. Following the Economist
(2003), I call this moral federalism.4
These observations raise at least three questions. First, what are the determinants of
moral federalism, such as the distribution of preferences? As explained in more detail below,
I argue that moral federalism is most likely to arise if those who advocate restriction of choice
have a majority in society, but just barely so. The second question relates to the e¤ect
of di¤erent institutional regimes. How do centralized and decentralized regimes compare
in ’resolving’ such moral con‡icts? And …nally, is moral federalism good or bad in some
normative sense? The answer to the last question is not obvious because there are always
some people who su¤er, either as a result of restriction of choice, or through other people’s
permissive actions.
By answering these questions the paper provides a positive and normative analysis of
moral federalism. To this end, I compare three di¤erent institutional regimes. First I consider
a centralized regime which is modeled as simple majority voting by the entire population
over a single-dimensional regulatory issue (like assisted suicide or gay marriage). The policy
decision a¤ects the freedom of choice of some individuals and impacts others who su¤er
from a permissive policy. Then a decentralized regime is analyzed: In each region policy is
chosen by majority voting subject to free mobility of individuals. Finally, a federal system
3Sen (1976) proves that there exists no social decision function that satis…es the following axioms: un-
restricted domain for preferences, Pareto principle, and minimal federalism (which, loosely speaking, gives
each subset of individuals the right to make the decision on one issue). This result is an extension of the
well known Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal result. Sen’s result casts doubt on ”solving” controversial
moral issues through decentralization. However, it leaves open how di¤erent institutional regimes perform
and thereby shape the incentives of groups with di¤erent interests to prefer one regime over another.
4Hendrickson (2002) provides a nice discussion of cases in which the U.S. federal government has tried to
overcome states’ decisions. She also uses the term moral federalism, but in a di¤erent way. Moral federalism
to her is what here is called decentralization in the Tiebout sense.
2is examined. In this case, the decentralized regime is augmented by a federal decision that
may or may not restrict regional choices. These three regimes correspond roughly to the
conceptualization in Buchanan (1996).
It is important to note that my paper does not say whether political conservatives or
political liberals are right. One interesting insight from the paper is that what matters from
a conceptual point of view is how many are in favor of restriction of choice (called conser-
vatives), and how many are in favor of individual choice (called liberals and libertarians),
as well as how strong preferences are. In the case of abortion and gay marriage political
conservatives are those who favor restriction of choice, while in the context of gun control
and the death penalty the political left advocates a restrictive regime. In other words, moral
federalism is not an exclusive feature of a politically conservative majority but one that could
equally occur under a left-leaning federal government.
The paper makes a number of novel contributions. At the conceptual level, the paper
o¤ers a framework for analyzing moral questions by modeling the interdependence of individ-
ual decisions as consumption externalities. An important feature is that the externalities are
not symmetric. An opponent of gay marriage or assisted suicide su¤ers when a homosexual
couple gets married or a terminally ill person is put to death. Yet the reverse is not true:
Homosexuals typically do not object to heterosexual marriages. In addition, and to the best
of my knowledge, the paper introduces a novel de…nition of an equilibrium under a federal
system. Loosely speaking, a federal equilibrium is a policy that constrains how permissive
regional policy choices can be, where the federal policy is the result of a weighted average
of what the general electorate and the regions want in the absence of a federal limit. The
weights can be interpreted as the bargaining strength of di¤erent legislative bodies at the
federal level (like the House of Representatives and the Senate in the U.S., or the Bundestag
and the Bundesrat in Germany).5 If in equilibrium the federal limit is tighter than what the
most permissive region desires to implement, as it happens under certain conditions, feder-
alism has bite. Thus as an important by-product of the analysis a multi-tier government
structure emerges endogenously.
The paper’s main results are derived in a situation with only three groups in society, called
5For a discussion of di¤erent notions of federalism see Inman and Rubinfeld (1997).
3conservatives, liberals and libertarians. I assume that individual utility is proportional to
individual losses (due to either restriction of choice or the negative externality arising from
actions of others). Conservatives choose the least permissive action and prefer that society
adopts the most restrictive policy. Liberals, by contrast, want society to allow complete
freedom of choice because that allows them to take permissive actions. Libertarians are
assumed to share the policy preference with liberals, but personally would not take such
actions, that is, they choose the same action as conservatives. When liberals and libertarians
outnumber conservatives centralization and decentralization give the same outcome in terms
of individual utilities. This result is straightforward because liberals always get their own
preferred choice, because either they have the political majority in central elections or because
they live together with libertarians in their own jurisdiction under decentralization and are
able to implement a permissive policy there. As a consequence, liberals and libertarians
(the majority group in terms of policy preference) do not want the federal government to
intervene. Federal intervention would restrict regional choices as the conservative jurisdiction
has a say in de…ning the federal limit.
By contrast, the equivalence between centralization and decentralization breaks down
when conservatives are the majority group in society. Under decentralization conservatives
su¤er from liberals’ actions. This makes it attractive for conservatives to let the federal
government intervene even if the federal limit is partly determined by the liberals’ and
libertarians’ desire to implement a permissive policy. In fact, the conservatives’ bene…t from
moving from the decentralized to a federal equilibrium is larger, the smaller the group of
conservatives is (subject to being the majority group and holding the number of libertarians
constant). In other words, when society is almost evenly split in its policy preference,
the conservatives’ gain of introducing their morals on others is maximized because each
conservative su¤ers from each liberal’s action and hence the product is maximized when
conservatives have (almost) the same strength as liberals and libertarians. This result is
consistent with Bush’s narrowelection victory in 2000and the push by the federal government
to limit states’ choices on certain moral issues, as mentioned above.
Furthermore, whether moral federalism (the move from decentralization to federalism) is
desirable in a normative sense can be related to the ranking of centralization and decentral-
ization. To do such ranking, I employ the concept of a veil of ignorance (see Harsanyi, 1955),
4where individuals decide on the institutional regime without knowing which preferences they
will have. Behind the veil, moral federalism is desirable if and only if centralization domi-
nates decentralization. The logic is quite intuitive: Moral federalism moves the outcome in
terms of individual utilities closer to the outcome under centralization. This is bene…cial only
when centralization is better than decentralization. The irony of the result is that those who
in general favor decentralized decision-making in the spirit of Tiebout, namely the political
conservatives, bene…t only when such system is ine¢cient to begin with. Stated di¤erently,
when the Tiebout equilibrium is desirable behind the veil of ignorance, moral federalism,
while bene…cial from the viewpoint of the group that can heavily impose its values through
the federal government, is not optimal from a normative standpoint.
These results hold when society is split into three groups with extreme preferences. In
an extension of the model I consider a group with intermediate preferences (the moderates)
while keeping the number of jurisdictions at two (assuming for simplicity that there are no
libertarians). Thus under decentralization there must be some mixing of types with dif-
ferent policy preferences, typically the conservatives in one jurisdiction and the remaining
two groups in the other jurisdiction. The general thrust of the original results continues
to hold, although with one interesting twist. When moderates outnumber liberals, central-
ization and decentralization give the same outcome because moderates dominate decision
making both when all vote and when only moderates and liberals vote in their jurisdiction.
The last two groups do not gain if the federal government steps in, as it would lead to a
further tightening of policy choice. The result is similar to the original one with liberals and
libertarians outnumbering conservatives. In the opposite case, when there are more liberals
than moderates, conservatives and moderates gain if the federal government steps in in an
attempt to constrain the liberals’ choice. Similar to the original result, the move to feder-
alism is bene…cial behind the veil of ignorance if centralization dominates decentralization
and the federal policy limit is not stricter than what moderates ideal policy is. The latter
requirement demonstrates that the normative properties of moral federalism are not trivially
linked to the ranking of centralization and decentralization.
There are very few papers that relate to this work directly. Rose-Ackerman (1981)
is perhaps closest by showing that a hierarchial federal system, under which higher-level
governments can preempt local governments, is not the same as a unitary government. In
5particular, she argues that some voters may welcome central government intervention in the
presence of local governments, that they otherwise would not. Beginning with Oates (1972)
there exists a large literature dealing with the question as to which level government should
provide public goods. Unlike the present paper, this literature typically considers symmetric
policy spillovers across regions, which a¤ect individuals in a similar way, that is, if a public
good spills over from region i to j, so does it from j to i, and all individuals within a region
are a¤ected similarly because they all value public goods. The present framework is also
indirectly related to a fairly special model of environmental pollution in a multijurisdictional
world, a connection that is further discussed in the concluding section.
The paper is organized as follow. Section 2 introduces the model and solves for the
equilibrium. Normative properties are derived in section 3. Two extensions, including the
consideration of a group with moderate preferences, are analyzed in section 4. The last
section concludes.
2 The Model
A country is populated by n individuals and is divided into two regions i = A;B. Individuals
can freely choose where to reside. Society must select a policy ¸ 2 [0;1]; which allows
individual action ¾ less than or equal to ¸: Examples for this type of policy choice is the
regulation of assisted suicide, where ¸ represents the legality and ease of ending the life of
a terminally ill person. The most restrictive policy is ¸ = 0 and allows only action 0 (e.g.,
assisted suicide prohibited), whereas the most liberal policy is ¸ = 1 and allows any action
from 0 to 1 (e.g., no restriction on assisted suicide). People di¤er in their preference over the
policy choice variable and their own preferred action. To simplify matters I consider three
groups, called conservatives, liberals and libertarians. I consider the case of ”moderates”
in section 4. A conservative always chooses action 0 and prefers that society should adopt
the restrictive policy ¸ = 0 (or policy 0 for short). A liberal (in the American use of the
word) chooses, when permitted, action 1 and therefore likes society to adopt policy 1. A
libertarian always chooses action 0, but believes that society should allow freedom of choice,
and therefore prefers ¸ = 1: There are nC conservatives, nL liberals, and nT libertarians,
so that nC + nL + nT = n: For simplicity I assume nL + nT 6= nC; an assumption that will
6become clearer later.
Each individual su¤ers from a di¤erent type of loss as a result of the policy choice.
More speci…cally, I assume that an individual su¤ers from other individuals’ actions or from
restriction of their own and other individuals’ actions. To simplify the analysis, I use a
reduced from approach, where the loss is additive separable from the utility derived from all
other individual choices. Furthermore, individual utility declines by the amount of a person’s
loss, which in turn is proportional to the distance between a person’s own ideal action and
her own or other individuals’ actions. Thus a liberal always chooses the maximum action
allowed (¾ = ¸
i), when residing in region i: When a liberal is forced to choose action ¾, she
su¤ers ®(1 ¡ ¾) where ® > 0 is a parameter. In addition a liberal su¤ers whenever another
liberal is restricted in her choice in the amount of ¯ per unit of choice restriction, where
® ¸ ¯ > 0. Because policies may di¤er across regions, a liberal living in region i has a utility
loss resulting from her own restriction of choice and her fellow liberals’ restriction both in
her and in the other region:
S
i
L = [® + ¯(n
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for i;j = A;B;i 6= j; where ni
L (n
j
L) is the number of liberals living in region i(j); and ¸
i(¸
j)
is the policy adopted in region i(j): Liberals do not care about the choices of conservatives
and libertarians because they can never be constrained in their choice.6
A conservative experiences a utility loss of °¾ for each person who selects action ¾








because all liberals choose the highest possible action and libertarians choose action 0. More-
over I assume the following tie-breaking rules: Ceteris paribus a conservative prefers living
in the region with the lowest policy in place, and when conservatives live by themselves, they
adopt policy 0. The assumptions simplify exposition, besides being intuitive.
6A ”true” liberal may think that conservatives should choose action 1 rather than 0. This aspect is
ignored however.
7In section 4 I examine the case where the utility loss depends on the choice of location of conservatives
and liberals, without a¤ecting results.
7Libertarians su¤er only when liberals are restricted in their choice, regardless of where
they and liberals live, in the amount of ±(1 ¡ ¸









Note that losses of liberals and libertarians are falling in ¸
A and ¸
B (for given residential
locations), and increasing for conservatives.
Society must make a decision as to which policy to adopt. I examine three di¤erent
institutional regimes. First I consider simple majority voting by the entire population over
the uniform policy ¸
A = ¸
B = ¸. This is interpreted as a centralized regime. Then a
decentralized regime is analyzed, which is characterized by majority voting in each of the
two regions A and B, allowing ¸
A and ¸
B to di¤er. Finally, a federal system is examined.
In this case, the decentralized regime is augmented by a federal policy limit ¸
F that may or
may not restrict regional choices. Precise equilibrium de…nitions are provided as the paper
proceeds. Moral federalism is de…ned as the move from decentralization to a federal system.
2.1 Centralization
Consider …rst centralization. To …x ideas, the following equilibrium notion is used.
A centralized equilibrium is a residential location for each individual and a policy choice
¸
A = ¸
B = ¸ such that
(i) ¸ is preferred by a majority of the population given residential choices, and
(ii) no individual can gain from moving to another jurisdiction given ¸:
The equilibrium is easy to characterize. Residential choices do not matter because a
common policy is adopted for the entire country and the conservatives’ utility losses are
independent of where people live. When the conservatives are in majority (nC > nL +
nT) policy 0 is selected and everybody must choose action 0. Each liberal’s utility loss is
[® + (nL ¡ 1)¯]; and each libertarian loses nL±: By contrast, when liberals and libertarians
outnumber conservatives (nL + nT > nC), society adopts policy 1. In this case liberals are
8not restricted (¾ = 1), and libertarians don’t su¤er at all, but each conservative su¤ers a
loss of nL°:
2.2 Decentralization
Consider next the decentralized regime. In this situation residential choices matter.




(i) no individual can gain from moving to the other region given (¸
A;¸
B), and
(ii) in each region the policy choice ¸
j;j = A;B; is a majority voting equilibrium given
residential choices.8
To complete the description of the game, I assume that if in a region the number of
conservatives on the one hand and liberals and libertarians on the other hand is the same,
each ideal policy is adopted with probability one half.
There are two types of decentralized equilibria. The …rst one has the property of dif-
ferent policies in the two regions, and is called a heterogeneous policy equilibrium. Such an
equilibrium always exists: Conservatives live by themselves in one region and adopt policy
0, while liberals and libertarians live together in the other region and unanimously adopt
policy 1. A liberal has no incentive to move to the conservatives’ region because her choice
would be restricted, and libertarians are indi¤erent with respect to location. By assumption
each conservative prefers joining his conservative fellows. Following the equilibrium charac-
terization in Epple and Romer (1991), such an equilibrium under decentralization could also
be called a strati…ed equilibrium, because individuals sort by preferred policy (but not by
preferred action).
In addition there might exist a homogeneous policy equilibrium under decentralization,
in which the same policy is adopted in both regions. This involves mixing of people with
8This equilibrium notion assumes myopic behavior because individuals do not take into account how their
choice of residence may a¤ect political outcomes. This assumption could be relaxed without much a¤ecting
the following results, but complicating exposition.
9di¤erent ideal policies, and therefore one could call this also a nonstrati…ed equilibrium.9
Proposition 1. Under decentralization a heterogeneous policy equilibrium always exists.
A homogeneous policy equilibrium exists if and only if j nC ¡ (nL + nT) j> 1:
Proof: The existence of the heterogeneous policy (strati…ed) equilibrium was already
shown. For the homogeneous policy (nonstrati…ed) equilibrium, consider …rst the case in
which the absolute di¤erence in group strength is larger than 1. Then individuals can be
allocated to the two regions such that the group that has the majority in the entire population
(either conservatives or liberals and libertarians jointly) has also a majority in each region.
The two regions adopt the same policy and residential locations are optimal given policy
choices.
Now consider the necessary part of the result. When j nC ¡ (nL + nT) j= 1; regions
cannot adopt the same policy. To see this, suppose that jointly liberals and libertarians
have the majority in society. Then they must have the majority in one region. In the other
region they are either in minority or have the same number as conservatives. When liberals
and libertarians are the minority group in the second region, policy choices in regions A
and B obviously di¤er. When liberals and libertarians have the same group strength as
conservatives in the second region, policy 0 and policy 1 are selected with probability one
half each. In that situation, however, all liberals have an incentive to join their fellows in
the …rst region. The remaining conservatives then choose policy 0, con…rming the statement
that a nonstrati…ed equilibrium with di¤erent regional policies is not possible. The same
logic applies when conservatives are the majority group, that is, nC = nL + nT + 1:10 ¥
Note that there can exist a large number of nonstrati…ed equilibria when j nC ¡ (nL +
nT) j>> 1; di¤ering only by residential choices. The implemented policies in both regions
are identical and follow the preferences of society’s majority group (in terms of ideal policy).
In the following I focus on individuals utilities, and hence speak simply of the nonstrati…ed or
9Earlier I made the assumption that ceteris paribus conservatives prefer living in the region with the more
restrictive policy in place. Therefore a homogenous policy equilibrium cannot be simply the heterogeneous
policy equilibrium with some conservatives moving together with the liberals and libertarians (such that
policy choices are una¤ected). Without the assumption this would be an equilibrium since the conservatives’
su¤ering is independent of their own and the liberals’ residential choices.
10In this case the assumption that conservatives prefer living in the region with the lowest ¸ in place
matters.
10heterogeneous policy equilibrium. It is now useful to compare the nonstrati…ed equilibrium
under decentralization, if it exists, with the centralized equilibrium. This gives the next
result.
Proposition 2. Assume j nC ¡ (nL + nT) j> 1: Individual utilities are identical under
centralization and under the homogeneous policy (nonstrati…ed) equilibrium under decen-
tralization.
The proof is straightforward after recognizing that a nonstrati…ed equilibrium requires
that both regions adopt the same policy, which must be the preferred policy of the popu-
lation’s majority group (either conservatives or liberals and libertarians jointly). This is of
course the same as if the population’s majority group had adopted the same policy under
centralization. The residential choices do not have to be the same under the two situations,
but this is immaterial as far as individual utilities are concerned. From Propositions 1 and
2 follows that the set of equilibria under decentralization strictly contains the centralized
equilibrium, when a nonstrati…ed equilibrium under decentralization exists. The next result
focuses on comparing the strati…ed and the nonstrati…ed equilibrium, which allows me to
compare the centralized and the decentralized outcome.
Proposition 3. Comparison of the heterogeneous and homogeneous policy equilibria under
decentralization:
a) When nC + 1 < nL + nT; policy 1 is adopted everywhere in both types of equilibria.
Each conservative su¤ers a utility loss of nL°.
b) When nL + nT + 1 < nC; the two equilibria di¤er in terms of policy choices and
individual utility losses. In the heterogeneous policy equilibrium each conservative
su¤ers nL°, whereas in the homogeneous policy equilibrium each liberal experiences a
utility loss of [® + (nL ¡ 1)¯]; and each libertarian loses nL±.
Proof: a) The conservatives always su¤er, either because under separation of types liberals
get to choose action 1, or because under nonstrati…cation the liberals and libertarians are
in majority everywhere to impose policy 1. b) The nonstrati…ed equilibrium leads to the
11adoption of policy 0 in both regions because the conservatives are in majority. This is
di¤erent under strati…cation, where liberals choose action 1. ¥
Proposition 3 makes a comparison of centralization and decentralization possible. Recall
that equilibria under centralized decision-making are a subset of the equilibria under decen-
tralization in terms of individual utilities. When the liberals and libertarians are in majority
there is no relevant di¤erence between the two regimes, but this does not hold in the reverse
case.
2.3 Federalism
Finally consider a federal system. Regions make their policy choice as under decentralization.
In addition, however, the federal government can impose a policy limit ¸
F: Regions must




that the federal policy is a combination of the preferences of the entire population and the
unrestricted regional choices. More precisely:
A federal equilibrium is a residential location for each individual, a regional policy choice tuple
(¸
A;¸
B); a federal policy limit ¸




); and the population’s
desired policy e ¸ such that
(i) no individual can gain from moving given regional policy choices (¸
A;¸
B);
(ii) each region’s policy choice ¸
j;j = A;B; is a majority voting equilibrium subject to the
constraint ¸
j · ¸
F; and given residential choices,
(iii) each region’s desired policy e ¸
j
;j = A;B; is a majority voting equilibrium in its region
in the absence of a federal policy limit and given residential choices,
(iv) the population’s desired policy e ¸ is a majority voting equilibrium, and





and the popular vote e ¸ such that ¸




)=2; where µ1 + µ2 = 1 and
µ1;µ2 > 0:
12Some explanations are in order. The key innovation here is the modeling of the federal
policy limit. As in many federations like the U.S., Germany or the EU, the federal policy is a
combination of what the population at large wants and what regions or regional governments
desire. This is captured in part (v) by assigning weights to the popular vote and each region’s
desired policy. Obviously this is a reduced form for a more complicated setting in which the
federal policy is the result of bargaining between di¤erent legislative bodies (as the Senate
and the House in the U.S. for example). The reduced form is su¢cient for the present
purpose. Another novelty is the desired regional policy e ¸
j
: It expresses a region’s preference
if it were not constrained in its choice. In equilibrium the desired policy may or may not
coincide with the actual policy. If it does, the federal policy limit is binding, and a multi-tier
government structure emerges endogenously. The following result is now straightforward.
Proposition 4. An equilibrium under a federal system exists.











0 if nC > nL + nT + 1
1 if nC + 1 < nL + nT: (4)
b) A heterogeneous policy (strati…ed) equilibrium always exists, where individuals sepa-
rate by type, and
¸










µ1 + µ2=2 2 (0;1) if nC < nL + nT
µ2=2 2 (0;1) if nC > nL + nT:
for i;j = A;B;i 6= j.
Proof: a) Allocate individuals as in the nonstrati…ed equilibrium under decentralization.
Because both regions and the population as a whole have the same majority group, actual
and desired regional policies and the federal limit coincide. The rest is straightforward.
b) Assume nC < nL + nT: Individuals can be separated by ideal policy type and then no
individual has an incentive to move given that policies di¤er. Conservatives choose and
13desire policy 0, while liberals and libertarians desire policy 1. For the federal limit, note
that the popular vote gives e ¸ = 1, so that ¸
F = µ1 ¢ 1 + µ2
2 (0 + 1) = µ1 + µ2
2 : In their region
liberals and libertarians choose a policy equal to this limit since their loss is increasing the
lower the policy. When nC > nL + nT, a similar logic applies, but now e ¸ = 0. ¥
In case a) all desired and actual policies coincide, and follow the preferences of society’s
majority group. This must be a nonstrati…ed equilibrium. By contrast, case b) demonstrates
the existence of a strati…ed equilibrium that always exists. Here federalism has bite by
restricting one region’s policy and leading to an interior policy choice. The extent of the
restriction is larger when conservatives are in majority than when liberals and libertarians
are, where the di¤erence comes from the change in the desired national policy.
The …nal result in this section clari…es the conservatives’ incentive to move to a federalist
regime starting from a Tiebout equilibrium.
Proposition 5. When conservatives are the majority group, each conservative gains when
moving from the heterogeneous policy (strati…ed) equilibrium under decentralization to the
heterogeneous policy equilibrium under federalism: The gain is larger, the bigger the su¤ering
from liberal actions (°), the smaller the jurisdictions’ weight in the federal decision (µ2); and
the smaller the conservative group’s strength (nC) holding nT constant.
The proof is straightforward after recognizing that the gain to a conservative equals
nL°(1 ¡¸
F); which is falling in nC (for given nT), increasing in °; and falling in the federal
policy limit, which depends positively on the regions’ weight. The result concerning group
strength is conditioned on holding the size of one group constant because changing the num-
ber of conservatives could come at the expense of either of the two other groups. Obviously,
the last statement in Prop. 5 holds if there are no libertarians. Prop. 5 is consistent with
the Bush administration’s attempts to overrule state initiatives in Oregon and California, as
discussed in the introduction.
143 How Much Decentralization Is Desirable?
I now turn to the normative analysis. It is clear that no matter what policy is adopted one
group su¤ers. Individual utilities are monotonic in ¸; holding locations …xed, but in opposite
directions for di¤erent groups. Hence any policy change is a move along the Pareto frontier.
Nevertheless, it is possible to say something more by adopting the concept of a veil of
ignorance (see Harsanyi, 1955). Society chooses the regime (centralization, decentralization,
federalism) by majority rule, at a time when each individual does not know her ideal policy
and action. What is known, however, is the distribution of types and thus the probability
of being a conservative nC=n; a liberal nL=n;or a libertarian nT=n.11 Behind the veil of
ignorance every individual is identical and thus there is no con‡ict of interest in choosing the
regime. Once the regime is selected and individual types are known, however, society decides
on policy ¸ as described in the previous section. Rational individuals correctly anticipate
the outcome under each regime when making their choice behind the veil of ignorance. I
assume that behind the veil individuals minimize the expected utility loss.
The expected utility loss behind the veil is easiest to calculate under each regime sepa-





















n if nL + nT > nC
nL(®+¯(nL¡1)+nT±)
n if nL + nT < nC;
where the …rst line represents the weighted sum of the loss of being a conservative, liberal
and libertarian respectively. The expression simpli…es depending on whether conservatives
are in majority, and thus ¸ = 0; or conservatives are the minority (¸ = 1): Note that the
expected utility loss in (6) is either decreasing or increasing in ¸; depending on parameters.
The loss function (6) can be used to describe the expected utility loss under decentraliza-
tion. Recall that the homogeneous policy equilibrium under decentralization is identical to
11This assumption could be further relaxed by assuming that the distribution is not known.
15the centralized outcome in terms of individual utilities (Prop. 2). The heterogeneous policy
outcome under decentralization involves only the loss of conservatives, which is found by
inserting ¸ = 1 into (6) and thus is equal to nLnC°=n.
Proposition 6. Consider the centralized and decentralized regimes. a) If nL + nT < nC;
the expected utility loss behind the veil of ignorance is maximal when society is (almost)
evenly split in its policy preference. b) Assume nL+nT > nC: Holding the number of liberals
constant, the expected utility loss behind the veil of ignorance is maximal when the number
of conservatives approaches n=2: Holding the number of libertarians constant, the expected
loss is maximized when nC = (n ¡ nT)=2:
Proof: a) Under centralization - and thus in the nonstrati…ed equilibrium under decentral-
ization - the expected loss is given by the last line in (6). The loss is falling in nC regardless
of whether the number of liberals or libertarians is held constant, that is
@[nL(® + ¯(nL ¡ 1) + nT±)=n]
@nC
< 0
for either nT or nL constant. b) The loss under centralization as well as under all equilibria
under decentralization is
nLnC°
n ; which is increasing in nC for constant nL. When nT is
constant, the loss (n ¡ nT ¡ nC)nC°=n is rising with nC if nC < (n ¡ nT)=2: ¥
Note that Proposition 6 applies also to the homogeneous policy equilibrium under feder-
alism because the chosen policy in all regions is either 0 or 1 (Prop. 4a). The result, however,
does not carry over to the heterogeneous policy equilibrium under federalism. To see this,
insert ¸
F in (6), where ¸
F = µ1 + µ2=2 if nC + nT > nC and ¸
F = µ2=2 if nC + nT < nC:
Di¤erentiating the expression with respect to the number of conservatives shows that the
loss is either rising or falling depending on parameters, in particular the value of ¸
F:
Assume now that conservatives are the majority group in society. In that case the
expected loss under centralization di¤ers from the loss under decentralization, assuming
that the latter is characterized by strati…cation (e.g., the heterogeneous policy equilibrium).
The expected losses are nCnL°=n and nL(® + ¯(nL ¡1) + nT±)=n; respectively. Behind the
veil of ignorance the strati…ed equilibrium dominates the nonstrati…ed equilibrium if and
only if
nC <
® + ¯(nL ¡ 1) + nT±
°
; (7)
16a condition that plays an important role further down. Condition (7) can be used to derive
more results when conservatives are the majority group. Since nC < n; strati…cation must
always welfare dominate nonstrati…cation when n < (® + (nL ¡ 1)¯ + nT±)=°: Intuitively,
this is a situation where liberals and/or libertarians su¤er a lot when the liberals’ choice is
restricted relative to the utility loss conservatives experience when the choice of liberals is
not constrained. On the other hand, when n=2 > (® + (nL ¡ 1)¯ + nT±)=°; the reverse is
true: nonstrati…cation always dominates separation by type because now the conservatives’
utility loss is relatively large. Therefore it is for intermediate values of the liberals’ and
libertarians’ losses; namely n=2 < (® + (nL ¡ 1)¯ + nT±)=° < n; for which the dominance
switches as the number of conservatives changes. Note again that these implications hold
only when conservatives are the majority group.
The …nal result addresses the normative properties of the regime switch, evaluated behind
the veil of ignorance. Recall that Proposition 5 showed that conservatives gain when moving
from decentralization to federalism. I assume, to make things realistic, that decentralization
is characterized by strati…cation.
Proposition 7. Behind the veil of ignorance, starting from a strati…ed equilibrium under
decentralization a move toward a federal system (i.e., moral federalism) improves expected
utility if and only if decentralization is inferior to centralization.
Proof: The expected loss under decentralization is nCnL°=n; while under federalism it
is nL[nC°¸
F + (® + (nL ¡ 1)¯ + nT±)(1 ¡ ¸
F)]=n: A move from the former to the latter is
bene…cial if the expected loss under decentralization is larger than the one under federalism,
that is, nC° > nC°¸
F + (® + (nL ¡ 1)¯ + nT±)(1 ¡ ¸
F) or
nC° > ® + (nL ¡ 1)¯ + nT±: (8)
This is exactly the opposite of condition (7). ¥
The logic for this result is quite intuitive. Federalism is a mixture of centralization and
decentralization. A move from decentralization to federalism is therefore bringing society
closer to what would have been chosen under centralization. Obviously, the transition is
bene…cial only when centralization is superior to decentralization in expected utility terms.
17The result is not trivially true, as an extension involving a group called moderates will show
(see section 4.2). Proposition 7 has an important corollary. When liberals outnumber con-
servatives centralization and decentralization give the same outcome in terms of individual
utilities (see Prop. 3). Together with Prop. 7 this implies that it is never in the liberals’
interest to let the federal government intervene.
4 Extensions
In this section I consider two extensions of the base model. The main conclusions of the
paper are una¤ected by both extensions.
4.1 Seeing vs. Knowing the Sin
In the basic version of the model I assumed that a conservative su¤ers a utility loss of °¾
whenever and wherever a liberal is allowed to take action ¾. How would results change
if instead one assumed that this utility loss is larger when it takes place inside the region
where the conservative lives (°i) than when it occurs outside that region (°o)? In other
words, I now assume that from a conservative’s viewpoint it is more harmful to see the
sin than just knowing that the sin happens. The main results are una¤ected. To see this,
reconsider …rst centralization. Nothing changes when conservatives dominate because policy
0 is adopted and liberals do not impose any externality on conservatives. However, when
liberals and libertarians outnumber conservatives even under centralization there is now an
incentive to separate by type, as conservatives are better o¤ by staying away from liberals.
Such separation is also found under decentralization. Hence the relevant parameter becomes
°o under both regimes, replacing ° from the original model.12
4.2 Intermediate Preferences: Moderates
A special feature of the base model is that all individuals have extreme preferences fro action
and policies. Assume therefore that there exists a group in society, called the moderates,
12Under decentralization there can exist nonstrati…ed equilibria, although now this requires that the num-
ber of conservatives is not too large. If such equilibria exist, they also exist under centralization.
18whose preferred action and policy preference is ¸M 2 (0;1): To simplify exposition I assume
no libertarians (nT = 0): Keeping the assumption of two regions, strati…cation by preferred
policy under decentralization is impossible. Consider the case in which none of the three
groups has a majority, that is ni < 0:5; for i = C;L;M; where nM = n ¡ nC ¡ nL is the
number of moderates. Under centralization, it is easy to see that the most preferred policy
of a moderate is adopted. Conservatives and moderates vote in favor of ¸M against any
other policy ¸ > ¸M, while moderates and liberals vote for ¸M against any lower ¸: Hence
liberals are choice constrained and conservatives su¤er from moderates’ and liberals’ actions.
Behind the veil of ignorance the expected loss is the sum of the conservatives’ and liberals’
losses:
nC(nL + nM)°¸M + nL[® + (nL ¡ 1)¯](1 ¡ ¸M): (9)
This outcome can be replicated under decentralization in the same way as in the base
model, by distributing individuals across regions such that neither conservatives nor liberals
have a majority in either region. More interesting is the possibility of a sorting equilibrium.
With two regions, however, only a semi-strati…ed equilibrium is possible, in which one group
inhabits one region, while the other two groups occupy the remaining region. Assume as
above that ceteris paribus conservatives prefer living in the region that has the least liberal
policy in place.
Proposition 8. In a semi-strati…ed equilibrium conservatives and liberals do not live to-
gether.
Proof: Liberals and conservatives do not live together when nC > nL; because liberals
would be better o¤ by moving to the region of the moderates. Similarly, when nC < nL
conservatives move to the other region, because by assumption they prefer to live in a region
with the least liberal policy. ¥
This leaves two possible con…gurations. It is easy to see that the moderates staying
together with the liberals is always an equilibrium. Regardless of who has the majority
in that region, individuals from neither group have an incentive to move to the region in
which conservatives rule. Note that the second con…guration, namely moderates residing
with conservatives, which is an equilibrium if and only if nM > nC; is equivalent in analysis
19to the situation where moderates stay together with and outnumber liberals. I therefore
focus on the case where conservatives inhabit one of the two regions by themselves.
In this semi-strati…ed equilibrium policy choices are straightforward. The conservatives
choose policy 0. In the other region the policy choice is either ¸M (if nM > nL) or 1 (if
nM < nL): The expected loss behind the veil of ignorance is
nC(nL + nM)°¸M + nL[® + (nL ¡ 1)¯](1 ¡ ¸M)
n
when nM > nL (10)
nC(nM¸M + nL)° + nMnL°(1 ¡ ¸M)
n
when nM < nL:
Note that the expected loss under centralization (eq. 9) and the loss reported in the
…rst line of (10) are the same. Hence centralization and decentralization are identical when
moderates outnumber liberals. When the latter condition is reversed, the semi-strati…ed
equilibrium under decentralization dominates centralization if the second line in (10) is less
than (9), or
nC + nM <
® + (nL ¡ 1)¯
°
: (11)
Finally, in a federal system the policy of the region inhabited by moderates and liberals
is the minimum of ¸




(µ1 + µ2=2)¸M when nM > nL
µ1¸M + µ2=2 when nM < nL:
A clear result emerges when the federal policy limit is higher than the moderates’ ideal point,
that is ¸
F ¸ ¸M; which requires nM < nL and ¸M · 0:5. In this case the expected loss is
nC(nM¸M + nL¸
F)° + nMnL(¸




where the three terms are the losses of being a conservative, a moderate and a liberal re-
spectively. I now compare the loss under federalism (12) with the one under decentralization
when liberals outnumber moderates (second line of 10). The former dominates the latter
exactly when (8) does not hold. This con…rms the logic of Proposition 7.
Proposition 9. Society consists of three groups, conservatives, liberals and moderates, of
which none has a majority.
20a) When nM > nL centralization and decentralization give the same outcome in terms
of individual utilities. Knowing their individual types, moderates and liberals prefer
either of the two regimes over federalism.
b) When nM < nL; and if ¸M · 0:5; moderates and conservatives prefer federalism over
decentralization when knowing their individual type. Behind the veil of ignorance
federalism dominates decentralization if and only if centralization dominates decen-
tralization.
Individual group preferences follow immediately. When moderates determine policy in
their jurisdiction under decentralization federalism would only constrain their and liberals’
choices. The ranking of regimes changes when liberals determine policy in one jurisdiction
under decentralization. In this case federalism is a tool for moderates and conservatives to
constrain liberals, as long as the federal policy limit is not too tight relative to the moderates’
ideal policy. No clear results can be derived when the federal policy limit is tighter than
¸M. Moderates now face a trade-o¤ between the restriction of their own choice and the gain
when liberals are forced to choose less permissive actions.
Overall Proposition 9 mirrors insights from section 3. Part a) is the equivalent to the
case where liberals (and libertarians) outnumber conservatives. There, decentralization and
centralization were identical in terms of utilities and liberals and libertarians did not want
a tighter policy imposed through federal intervention. Part b) of Proposition 9 parallels the
situation when conservatives outnumber liberals and libertarians in a model with extreme
preferences only. The results here di¤er somewhat, however, as it is derived under an ad-
ditional assumption on the level of the federal policy limit relative to the moderates’ ideal
policy.
5 Conclusion
This paper analyzes collective decision making in a situation in which individuals have strong
preferences not only about their own actions but also about other individual’s choices, which
is quite typical for many hotly contested issues like abortion, the death penalty or assisted
suicide. Instead of repeating the main results of the paper it is perhaps important to point
21out how the present framework di¤ers from other work, notably standard Tiebout analyses
and work on environmental externalities. Consider Tiebout models …rst. An important is-
sue within this class of models is whether the equilibrium is e¢cient. Public good spillovers
or tax competition are reasons for ine¢ciency. Note, however, that there are interesting
di¤erences to the present work. For example, in Tiebout models the external e¤ects arise
from the policy itself (instead from allowing but not requiring certain individual actions),
and are typically symmetric, that is spillovers go in both directions (whereas in the present
framework conservatives are bothered by liberals’ actions in another jurisdiction, but the
reverse is not true). In addition, it seems feasible (subject to political economy considera-
tions) that a central government could intervene and correct these ine¢ciencies by setting
appropriate taxes and subsidies. By contrast, such government intervention seems di¢cult
here. If abortion is a fundamental right, taxing it will be di¢cult. Moreover, it is probably
impossible to compensate those who favor restriction of choice due to the sheer magnitude
of the subjectively perceived losses and the adverse selection problem in identifying losers.
For these reasons, the extent to which society should allow decentralized decision-making is
probably the best and perhaps only way of dealing with such hotly contested issues.
There exists also a similarity to the work on cross-border pollution or other environ-
mental externalities. The present framework is identical to a model in which pollution is
a truly global bad, people with opposite preferences live in di¤erent communities, and the
externalities arise from individual action rather than from …rm activities. These assump-
tions appear rather special in the context of environmental issues. By contrast, the present
framework seems to be a natural one for the type of political issue that fuels controversial
debates throughout the world.
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